Should People Who Lose Their Refugee Status Be Deported?

Much of the media attention towards Bill C-31 – the Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act - has been focused on its shortening of the time periods for processing refugee claims and its removal of some appeal rights for refugee claimants that were supposed to be introduced under the Balanced Refugee Reform Act.  This past week, members of the immigration bar raised concerns about another questionable change.  In short, Bill C-31 will make it so that refugees who became permanent residents of Canada will lose their permanent residence status if their refugee status ceases.

Currently, the Immigration and Refugee Board may cease a person’s refugee status.  Amongst other reasons, it may do so if the reasons for which the person sought refugee protection have ceased to exist, or if the person reavails himself to the protection of his country of origin. Until now, the cessation of refugee status did not result in the loss of permanent resident status.  Accordingly, ceasing a refugee’s refugee status was rarely pursued where the refugee had become a permanent resident.

Bill C-31, however, changes this.  It provides that when the IRB ceases a refugee’s refugee status, then the former refugee also loses his/her permanent resident status.  Bill C-31 also provides that such an individual would be inadmissible toCanada.  Through omission it also provides that there will be no appeal to the Immigration Appeal Division, meaning that humanitarian & compassionate grounds (such as hardship and establishment inCanada) cannot be considered in deciding whether to revoke the person’s permanent resident status.

This will apply to refugees who made their claims in Canadaand to those who were resettled to Canadafrom refugee camps from abroad.  It would apply to refugees who recently obtained status, and to refugees who became permanent residents many, many years ago.

Before jumping to conclusions about whether this is or is not good law, it is useful to present some examples of when someone’s refugee status might be ceased.

Tisha is a Tamil fromSri Lanka.  In 2008, she arrived inTorontoand claimed refugee status because of the ongoing war inSri Lanka. In 2010 Tisha’s refugee status was approved.  She became a permanent resident later that year.  She has lived continuously inCanadasince arriving in 2008.  She runs a restaurant that employs 15 people.  In 2012, the IRB determined thatSri Lankawas now safe for Tamils because the civil war had ended.  It ceased her refugee status.

 

Wang is a Chinese citizen who is a Catholic.  In 2008, he arrived inVancouverand claimed refugee status.  He married a Canadian in 2009. His claim was approved in 2010, and he became a permanent resident in 2011.  Wang immediately returned toChina, and has lived there while working abroad for a Canadian company since. In 2012, the IRB determined that Wang was no longer at risk of persecution for being Catholic, and ceased his refugee claim.

 

Kim is fromKorea.  She fled an abusive husband who was a high ranking official in the government, and also had ties to the mafia.  Her refugee status was approved in 2006, and she became a permanent resident of Canada in 2008.  She has two Canadian born children, and is the director of aCanada– Korean business association.  In 2011, her husband died. In 2012, the IRB determined that Kim was no longer at risk of persecution in Korea.

 

As a result of Bill C-31, all of the above individuals would lose their permanent resident status and be removed fromCanada.

When looking at the above three scenarios some may question why it is relevant where the individuals worked.  However, it is important because permanent residents do not live in a vacuum.  They become members of their local community, and conduct their affairs with the legitimate expectation that their residency inCanada is permanent, or at least subject to their control.

Bill C-31 throws a wrench in this.  It provides that refugees who became permanent residents can lose their permanent resident status and be removed from Canadathrough no fault of their own.  The loss of status is not predicated on the refugee having lied.  Rather, it is based on circumstances beyond their control.  Furthermore, there will be no degree of establishment or hardship that the permanent resident can show to keep his status.

Even if one does not believe that Canada does not owe anything to people who are not Canadian citizens, then one should still question whether the automatic revocation of permanent resident status with no appeal right is a good thing for Canada.  There will be the economic costs to Canada in the form of employees and employers abruptly having to leave. There will also be personal costs to Canadians dependent on them.

To me, the solution to the above-mentioned problems appears obvious.  If the government is determined that the cessation of refugee status should lead to a loss of permanent resident status, then it should provide an appeal right to the Immigration Appeal Division where humanitarian & compassionate considerations can be considered.

I cannot think of a single, strong reason why it should not do so.

Useful Rehabilitation Decision

It’s not often that you see a Federal Court decision specifically discussing whether an officer’s decision to reject an Application for Criminal Rehabilitation was reasonable.  That’s why I read the just released decision in Hadad v. Canada (The Minister of Citizenship, Immigration, and Multiculturalism), 2011 FC 1503, with much interest.

The case affirmed several important principles of rehabilitation applications, including that:

  • The Minister should take into consideration the unique facts of each particular case and consider whether the overall situation warrants a finding that the individual has been rehabilitated.
  • That rehabilitation is forward looking.
  • That an officer commits a reviewable error if he/she attributes too much importance to the fact that an applicant has past criminal activity as opposed to the likelihood that the applicant would be involved in future or unlawful activity.

I have embedded in this post Justice O’Keef’s discussion of these principles.

 

New Inadmissibility Checklists for US Nationals

Canadian Missions in the United States have released several new checklists that are not found on the CIC main page.

Importantly, there is now a checklist for Temporary Resident Permit applications.

The checklists are:

Application for Rehabilitation Checklist

Application for Authorization to Return to Canada Checklist

Application for a Temporary Resident Permit Checklist

Immigration Consequences of the Omnibus Crime Bill

On December 5, the House of Commons passed Bill C-10, also known as the Safe Streets and Communities Act, or the Omnibus Crime Bill.

Bill C-10 introduces numerous changes which will affectCanada’s immigration system:

Changes to Sentencing Provisions

Crime Sentence Immigration Consequence
Sexual Interference (touching an individual who is under the age of 16) Remains a hybrid offense with a maximum term of imprisonment of not more than 10 years. Conviction results in inadmissibility for serious criminality.
Invitation to Sexual Touching (for an individual who is under the age of 16) Remains a hybrid offense with a maximum term of imprisonment of not more than 10 years. Conviction results in inadmissibility for serious criminality.
Sexual Exploitation (of a young person) Remains a hybrid offense with a maximum term of imprisonment of not more than 10 years. Conviction results in inadmissibility for serious criminality.
Incest Remains a hybrid offense with a maximum term of imprisonment of not more than 14 years. Conviction results in inadmissibility for serious criminality.
Bestiality Remains a hybrid offense with a maximum term of imprisonment of not more than 10 years. Conviction results in inadmissibility for serious criminality.
Making Child Pornography Remains a hybrid offense with a maximum term of imprisonment of not more than 10 years. Conviction results in inadmissibility for serious criminality.
Distributing Child Pornography Remains a hybrid offense with a maximum term of imprisonment of not more than 10 years. Conviction results in inadmissibility for serious criminality.
Possession of Child Pornography Remains a hybrid offense with a maximum term of imprisonment of not more than 5 years. Convictions results in inadmissibility for criminality.
Accessing Child Pornography Remains a hybrid offense with a maximum term of imprisonment of not more than 5 years. Conviction results in inadmissibility for criminality.
Parent or Guardian Procuring Sexual Activity where the Victim is Under the Age of 16 An indictable offense whose maximum penalty rises from not exceeding 5 years to 10 years. Conviction now results in inadmissibility for serious criminality rather than general.
Parent or Guardian Procuring Sexual Activity where the Victim is Over the Age of 16 but under 18 Remains a indictable offense with a new maximum term of imprisonment of not more than 5 years. Conviction results in inadmissibility for criminality.
Householder Permitting Sexual Activity where the Victim is Over the Age of 16 but under 18 Remains a indictable offense with a new maximum term of imprisonment of not more than 2 years. Conviction results in inadmissibility for criminality.
Making Sexually Explicit Material Available to Child New crime.

 

Hybrid offense with a maximum term of imprisonment of not more than 2 years.

Conviction results in inadmissibility for criminality.
Luring a Child Remains a hybrid offense with a maximum term of imprisonment of not more than 10 years. Conviction results in inadmissibility for serious criminality.
Agreement or Arrangement to Commit a Sexual Offense Against a Child Remains a hybrid offense with a maximum term of imprisonment of not more than 10 years. Conviction results in inadmissibility for serious criminality.
Indecent Acts Goes from being a summary offense to a hybrid offense with a maximum term of imprisonment of not more than 2 years. Conviction results in inadmissibility for criminality.
Exposing Oneself to a Minor Remains a hybrid offense with a maximum term of imprisonment of not more than 2 years. Conviction results in inadmissibility for criminality.
Sexual Assault Remains a hybrid offense with a maximum term of imprisonment of not more than 10 years. Conviction results in inadmissibility for serious criminality.
Sexual Assault Causing Bodily Harm Remains a hybrid offense with a maximum term of imprisonment of not more than 14 years. Conviction results in inadmissibility for serious criminality.
Trafficking or Possessing for the Purpose of Trafficking a Schedule I or II substance Remains an indictable offense with a maximum term of imprisonment of life. Conviction results in inadmissibility for serious criminality.
Trafficking or Possessing for the Purpose of Trafficking a Schedule II in less than a prescribed amount Becomes an indictable offense with a maximum term of imprisonment of not more than 5 years. Conviction results in inadmissibility for criminality.
Importing and Exporting a Schedule I, II substance Remains an indictable offense with a maximum term of imprisonment of life. Conviction results in inadmissibility for serious criminality.
Producing a Schedule I substance Remains an indictable offense with a maximum term of imprisonment of life. Conviction results in inadmissibility for serious criminality.
Producing a Schedule II substance, other than marijuana Indictable offense with a maximum sentence of imprisonment to life. Conviction results in inadmissibility for serious criminality.
Production of Cannabis Maximum sentence increases from not more than 7 years to not more than 14 Conviction now results in inadmissibility for serious criminality.
     

In noting the above, it is important to note that Flunitrazepam and Gamma-Hydroxybutyric acid (both common date rape drugs) have been added to Schedule I.

Banning Some Foreign Workers

The Minister shall now have the ability to issue instructions prescribing public policy considerations that aim to protect foreign nationals who are at risk of being subjected to humiliating or degrading treatment, including sexual exploitation.

Immigration Officers shall refuse visas if the Minister’s Instructions directs them to do so.

In essence, this is the re-introduction of Bill C-56 – The Preventing the Trafficking, Abuse, and Exploitation of Vulnerable Immigrants Act, discussed here.

Certified Question on Misrepresentation

I recently did a post about a Federal Court decision which suggests that there is an innocent mistake exception to misrepresentation.  Not one week later, Justice Hughes of the Federal Court certifies the following question:

Is a foreign national inadmissible for misrepresenting a material fact if at the time of filing his/her application for permanent residence or at the time of granting permanent residence he/she had no knowledge of the material fact that constituted such misrepresentation?

The Federal Court of Appeal’s answer to this certified question will likely clarify many aspects of s. 40 misrepresentation.

The facts giving rise to the question can briefly be summarized as follows: Mr. Osisanwo submitted a birth certificate stating that he was the child of Cladius and Modupe. Immigration officials were not satisfied with the birth certificate and required DNA testing.  The testing concluded that while Modupe was Mr. Osisanwo’s mother, Cladius was not his father.  Modupe stated that she did not know that Cladius was not the biological father, and this point as not challenged.

In discussing the jurisprudence on the matter, Justice Hughes quoted at length from the Federal Court’s decision in Singh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 378.  There, the court stated that:

Given that the word “knowingly” does not appear in Section 40, it follows, the submission goes, that knowledge is not a prerequisite to a finding of misrepresenting or withholding material facts. Undoubtedly, the existence of a child is a material fact.

I do not find this comparison helpful. Section 127 is in the “General Offences” section of IRPA. A misrepresentation could lead to imprisonment for a term of up to five years. If the word “knowingly” had not been employed, Parliament ran the risk of establishing an absolute liability offence, without the need for mens rea, and might have run afoul of the constitutional prohibition on imprisonment for absolute liability offences (see, e.g., R. v. Sault Ste-Marie, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1299 and R. v. Raham, 2010 ONCA 206).

In this case the alleged misrepresentation was a misstatement of fact. Such misrepresentations may be fraudulent, negligent or innocent. A leading case in the tort context is Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd, [1964] A.C. 465, [1963] 2 All ER 575 (H.L.).

The Panel found that Mr. Singh was not credible. Even if he did not actually know he was Shilpa’s father, the circumstances, i.e. his long sexual relationship with Shilpa’s mother, while her husband was out of India, should, at the very least, have put him on inquiry. He had a duty of candour which required him to disclose, upon his arrival inCanada in 1993, the strong possibility that he had fathered a child.

In my opinion, the meaning of Section 40(1)(a) of IRPA was clearly explained by Mr. Justice O’Reilly in Baro v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 1299, where he stated at para. 15:

Under s. 40(1)(a) of IRPA, a person is inadmissible to Canada if he or she “withholds material facts relating to a relevant matter that induces or could induce an error in the administration” of the Act. In general terms, an applicant for permanent residence has a “duty of candour” which requires disclosure of material facts. This duty extends to variations in his or her personal circumstances, including a change of marital status:Mohammed v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1997] 3 F.C. 299 (F.C.T.D.) (QL). Even an innocent failure to provide material information can result in a finding of inadmissibility; for example, an applicant who fails to include all of her children in her application may be inadmissible: Bickin v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2000] F.C.J. No. 1495 (F.C.T.D.) (QL). An exception arises where applicants can show that they honestly and reasonably believed that they were not withholding material information: Medel v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1990] 2 F.C. 345, [1990] F.C.J. No. 318 (F.C.A.) (QL).

[My emphasis.]

Mr. Justice Russell applied the same reasoning in Boden v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 848.

The Panel’s assessment of the facts was not unreasonable and so it follows that Mr. Singh, a permanent resident, is inadmissible for misrepresentation.

As noted by Justice Hughes, the essential question is whether one takes an “objective” or “subjective” view as to whether what was done was “misleading’. Stated another way, is mens rea an essential ingredient of s. 40 misrepresentation?

Justice Hughes then went on to cite several other cases, including Hilario, Mendel, Bickin, and Bodine, which seem to suggest that there is a mens rea requirement for misrepresentation.

Finally, he noted an interesting sub-question, which is “must an applicant seeking entry into Canada disclose every extra-marital relationship conducted at a time where there is any possibility that a child might have been fathered by someone other than the husband?”

It will be interesting to see if the Federal Court of Appeal answers that second question as well as the first.

 

 

Innocent Mistakes, Misunderstandings, and Misrepresentation

Flickr photo by Deniz Ozuygur

As I have blogged extensively about, one of the most difficult issues to resolve when an individual is immigrating to Canada is allegations of misrepresentation.

Section 40(1)(a) of Canada’s Immigration and Refugee Protection Act states provides that a permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible to Canada for misrepresentation for directly or indirectly misrepresenting or withholding material facts relating to a relevant matter that induces or could induce an error in the administration of Canadian immigration law.

A significant issue that often arises is whether or not a misrepresentation has to be intentional.  The jurisprudence indicates that in order for a finding of misrepresentation to be made, an applicant doe not have to intend to misrepresent themselves: Chen v. Canada, 2005 FC 678.   They do, however, have to be satisfied that the person was subjectively aware of the information that they allegedly misrepresented.  A party cannot be faulted for failing to impart information which is unknown to him/her: Jean-Jacques v. Canada, 2005 FC 104.

But what about where there is an innocent mistake or misunderstanding?  If an officer is satisfied that an individual has innocently misrepresenting something, can the fact that the misrepresentation was innocently made be an exception to misrepresentation?

In Berlin v. Canada (2011), the Court explored in detail whether such an exception exists.  There, an immigration officer determined that Mr. B had committed misrepresentation because Mr. B failed to declare his relationship as the adoptive father of two children from a previous marriage.  When the immigration officer asked why he did not declare them, Mr. B indicated that he did not believe them to be dependants for the purpose of Canadian immigration purposes.

In analysing the issue of whether innocent mistake was an exception to misrepresentation, the Court first noted that the Citizenship and Immigration Canada Enforcement Manual seemed to provide for such an exception.  The relevant sections include ENF02 s. 9.3, which informs immigration officers that:

It must be recognized that honest errors and misunderstandings sometimes occur in completing application forms and responding to questions. While in many cases it may be argued that a misrepresentation has technically been made, reasonableness and fairness are to be applied in assessing these situations.

As well, ENF02 s. 9.10 states that the following situation would not generally constitute misrepresentation:

It must be recognized that honest errors and misunderstandings sometimes occur in completing application forms and responding to questions. While in many cases it may be argued that a misrepresentation has technically been made, reasonableness and fairness are to be applied in assessing these situations.

The Court also cited numerous other decisions which support the notion of an exception for innocent misrepresentation, including Medel v. Canada (MEI), [1990] 2 FC 345, Baro v. Canada (MCI), 2007 FC 1299, Merion-Borrego v. Canada (MCI), 2010 FC 631, and Koo v. Canada (MCI), 2008 FC 931.

Ultimately, the Court in Berlin affirmed that there is an exception for innocent mistake which may excuse what might otherwise appear to be a deliberate misrepresentation.  As well, in considering whether a misrepresentation is innocent or deliberate, an almost determinative factor will be whether or not the accurate information was presented in either supporting documentation or other forms.  In Berlin, for example, the applicant had included his adoptive children in a Personal Information Form.  The Court held that this strongly suggested that his failure to include it in his application form was indeed an innocent misrepresentation.

 

 

 

R v. Topp, Fines, and Criminal Inadmissibility

 

By Andres Rueda

An individual who is criminally inadmissible to Canada will be eligible to apply for rehabilitation after five years have passed since the individual completed his/her sentence.  A sentence can include imprisonment, a fine, or probation.

Next to probation, the payment of a fine is a type of sentence that can significantly extend a person’s sentence for Canadian immigration purposes.  The reason is because the payment of fines are often staggered over a period of time.  This is especially the case in the United States, where, for example, I have seen fines of $2000 stretched over twenty $100 monthly payments.

The Supreme Court of Canada recently released a decision which makes me wonder whether there may be a potential argument that a fine imposed outside of Canada should not be counted for the purpose of determining eligibility to apply for rehabilitation if the inadmissible person can argue that he/she simply cannot pay it.

In R v. Topp, 2011 FC 43, the accused used his brokerage business to defraud Canada Customs of $4.7 million.  The Crown sought a $4.7 million fine in addition to imprisonment.  The trial judge sentenced the accused to imprisonment but declined to impose a fine because she was not satisfied as required by s. 734(2) of the Criminal Code that the accused was able to pay a fine.

Section 734(2) of Canada’s Criminal Code provides that:

Except when the punishment for an offence includes a minimum fine or a fine is imposed in lieu of a forfeiture order, a court may fine an offender under this section only if the court is satisfied that the offender is able to pay the fine or discharge it under section 736.

In upholding the trial judge’s decision, the Supreme Court noted that an affirmative finding that an offender is able to pay is therefore required before a find can be imposed.  In declaring this principle, the Supreme Court cited its previous decision in R v. Wu, 2003 SCC 73, where it noted that:

A means inquiry is now a condition precedent to the imposition of a fine except where otherwise provided by law.

A potential client is criminally inadmissible to Canada.  He sent me a fax which demonstrates that although the offense occurred several years ago, he is simply unable to pay the huge fine that the court imposed against him.  As I read this fax I can’t help but wonder… Can the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Topp be applied to argue that Citizenship and Immigration Canada should not consider the fine for the purpose of determining when the eligibility for rehabilitation begins?

 

Plea Bargaining and Canadian Immigration

The test for determining whether an individual is inadmissible to Canada is closely inter-twined with the criminal justice system of every country that that person has lived in.  The determining factor for whether an individual is inadmissible to Canada or not is whether the person was convicted.  It is not what the sentence was.

Our immigration system’s emphasis on convictions over sentences bears little resemblance to how the criminal-justice system of most countries work.  Most people who are charged with an offense are more concerned with what their sentence will be (“will I receive jail time?”) as opposed to whether they are convicted.   Accordingly, plea-bargaining has become the hallmark of most states’ criminal-justice system.  Individuals who probably would not be convicted of their serious original charge are more than willing to avoid the risk of being convicted by pleading guilty to a lighter offense in exchange for little to no sentence.

Unfortunately, this leads to the trend of there being a lot more people with criminal records out there then there otherwise would be if people did not succumb to plea-bargaining, and if prosecutors not able to so rely on bargain results.   The Journal of Law, Economics and Policy recently published an article highlight this relationship between plea-bargaining and overcriminalization.  The article is titled “Overcriminalization 2.0: The Symbiotic Relationship between Plea Bargaining and Overcriminalization”, and can be downloaded here.

Some key excerpts include:

There is an enormous problem with plea bargaining, particularly given that over 95% of defendants in the federal criminal justice system succumb to the power of bargained justice.

(Citing the United States Supreme Court)  This is not to say that guilty plea convictions hold no hazard for the innocent or that the methods of taking guilty pleas presently employed in this country are necessarily valid in all respects. This mode of conviction is no more foolproof than full trials to the court or to the jury. Accordingly, we take great precautions against unsound results, and we should continue to do so, whether conviction is by plea or by trial. We would have serious doubts about this case if the encouragement increased the likelihood that defendants, advised by competent counsel, would falsely condemn themselves.

(Citing another study) [T]he results of our research suggest that some defendants who perhaps were innocent, and a larger group who probably would have been acquitted had the case gone to trial, were nonetheless induced to plead guilty.

I receive a phone call from at least one person a week who says something along the lines of “I was charged with a DUI.  I totally didn’t do it.  However, the prosecutor told me that I could either risk facing jail time, or plead guilty to the reduced charge of Negligent Driving, and face only a couple hundred dollar fine.  That’s less than what hiring a lawyer to even go to the court house would cost!”

Unfortunately, the result is that because of the guilty plea the individual becomes inadmissible to Canada.

Overcriminalization abroad and in Canada is not the fault of Canadian immigration authorities.  It is not practical for Citizenship and Immigration Canada and the Canada Border Services Agency to take plea bargaining into consideration when encountering an individual with a criminal record.  However, I do believe that the criminal justice system, and its prosecutors and defense attorney’s alike, have a responsibility to the accused that they force plea bargains upon to fully explain the consequences of a criminal conviction even if there is barely a sentence.